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Ma Ying-jeou is now President of the Republic of China (ROC), and his rul-
ing Nationalist Party (Koumingtang, henceforth KMT) controls the ROC’s
legislature. Ma’s inauguration in May 2008 marked a critical turning point. It
helped defuse heightened politico-military tension with the People’s Republic
of China (PRC), which had built up during President Chen Shui-bian’s preced-
ing two terms (20002008).
Chen persistently ignored the cross-Strait status quo involving Taiwan’s
current de facto independence, a precarious regional equilibrium in the geo-
strategic triangle of the United States, the PRC, and Japan ; Japan plays an im-
portant role indirectly through the U.S.-Japan alliance. Chen challenged the
status quo by taking radical measures, inter alia, to de-Sinicize the names of
public monuments and organizations and to propose a national referendum on
de jure independence. Chen got elected as President in 2000 since his pro-
independence hard line coincided with rising Taiwanese identity vis--vis de-
clining Chinese identity among the electorate. Thereafter, however, Chen’s
hard line significantly hindered the development of cross-Strait relations, and
the economic well-being of the Taiwanese people stagnated. Taiwan’s eco-
nomic growth relies heavily on the rapidly growing mainland markets in in-
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vestment, production, and trade. Further exacerbated by Chen’s corruption is-
sues, his successor candidate of the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) suf-
fered from a bitter loss in the 2008 presidential election.
Apparently, the birth of the Ma administration evinced pragmatism of the
Taiwanese people who preferred prosperity to de jure independence, at least
at the time of the election. Ma’s approach departs from Chen’s pro-
independence hard line that, from Ma’s perspective, unnecessarily provoked
the regime in Beijing to wage unflinching diplomatic battles against Taiwan’s
statehood. Ma’s approach aims to achieve a between Taiwan and the
mainland, emphasizing the need for Taiwan’s growth and development through
further economic engagement with the mainland economy.
This policy paper first analyzes Ma’s rationale of , focusing on some
of the major weaknesses of the current cross-Strait in general and
Taiwan’s de facto independence in particular. The analysis looks at those con-
ditions under which themost likely would collapse. That is, if Ma’s ap-
proach made Taiwan too dependent on the mainland economy for its survival
and prosperity to withstand Beijing’s economic, political, and military pres-
sures, Taiwan would be compelled to accede to unification on Beijing’s terms.
The paper examines some proposals to help Japanese policy makers cope with
cross-Strait relations after, identifying Japan’s national interests in re-
gard to Taiwan and analyzing constraints and limitations of Japan’s Taiwan pol-
icy after 1945. Those who are interested in the evolving cross-Strait relations
in the United State, the PRC, the ROC, and elsewhere, would benefit from be-
ing acquainted with possible Japanese policy actions.
1．Ma’s Rationale of 	
	
In his inaugural address of May 20, 2008, President Ma confirmed the 1992
consensus reached between Beijing and Taipei and unequivocally rejects the
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de jure independence of a Republic of Taiwan
(１)
. The consensus refers to recog-
nition of “one China” with respective interpretations of the term, without de-
termining whether “one China” means the ROC or the PRC. The President
also confirmed his respect for the ROC’s constitution and committed to adher-
ing to it rather than amending it to reflect the ROC’s effective control over
only Taiwan and the other adjacent islands
(２)
.
President Ma’s inaugural address also stresses the need to maintain peace
with the mainland as well as regional stability. He states that Taiwan has to be
a “peace-maker” although it used to be a “trouble-maker” under Chen’s pro-
independence hard line. Ma’s assertions agreed with PRC President Hu Jin-
tao’s opening address to the Boao Forum on April 12, 2008. That is, they both
believe that “reconciliation and truce in both cross-strait and international
arenas” will be made possible by “building mutual trust, shelving controver-
sies, finding commonalities despite differences, and creating together a win-
win solution.” For the initial concrete steps toward, Ma proposed “the
normalization of economic and cultural relations” across the Taiwan Strait and
then the cease of “vicious competition and the waste of resources” in the dip-
lomatic battles both for and against Taiwan’s statehood.
On September 25, 2008, the ROC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a
Foreign Policy Report to the legislature, which elucidated Ma’s cross-Strait pol-
icy in terms of “flexible diplomacy” characterized by “diplomatic truce” and
“proactive diplomacy
(３)
.” The primary aim of “flexible diplomacy” is minimizing
Chinese threat, amassing Taipei’s bargaining power vis--vis Beijing, and ex-
panding Taipei’s ability to maneuver internationally amid Beijing’s all-out dip-
lomatic offensives. The Report presumes that Taipei’s commitment to the
1992 consensus will form the solid foundation of cross-Strait, focusing
on improving Taipei’s relations with Beijing by discussing their common inter-
ests and fostering mutual trust. Under this cross-Strait “diplomatic truce,”
Beijing should at least suspend its unflinching diplomatic battles against Taipei
	
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and free it from endlessly bleeding its limited resources to aid diplomacy for
merely retaining its current diplomatic allies. These resources then could be
used “to strengthen relations with [Taipei’s] diplomatic allies”, and to
“upgrade the level of contact with many countries in each region and integrate
[Taiwan] into the Asia-Pacific regional economy. ” The “diplomatic truce” also
should end Taipei’s diplomatic isolation, opening to opportunities to participate
in functional and specialized international organizations.
In sum, Ma’s “flexible diplomacy” is based on the strong optimism that Bei-
jing would accept cross-Straitas a win-win game of mutual growth and
prosperity, as far as Taipei withdraws the pro-independence hard line. Then,
it is crucial to examine whether such optimism is tenable nor not.
2．The Pitfalls of 	
	
In order to ascertain Beijing’s real motive in pursuit of cross-Strait
it is critical to analyze not only Beijing’s immediate need of rapprochement but
also its expected power structural transformation. Beijing seems to have sup-
ported the Ma administration and the ruling KMT, as demonstrated by Hu’s
speech at the Boao Forum. Indeed, its failure to do so would most likely turn
Taiwanese public opinion againstand then bring back to power the op-
position DPP that would adopt a more tenacious pro-independence position.
Thus Beijing is compelled to reciprocate Taipei’sinitiatives, at least as
long as Ma and the KMT continue in power. In turn, Beijing will be restrained
from resorting to armed attack or imposing an economic blockade of Taiwan,
unless, of course, Taipei provokes Beijing, for instance, by abruptly switching
to de jure independence.
Beijing’s need to reciprocate does not necessarily mean, however, that its
top leaders are firmly committed to . While Taipei has already begun
to take unilateral initiatives toward , Beijing has discretion over its
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response to Taipei, in regard to the scope and the levels of reciprocation :
which issue-areas to select and to which extent to implement. Accordingly,
Beijing may try to minimize the substance of and then tip the cross-
Strait balance of power in its favor. Taipei then would face an increasing mili-
tary threat and deepening economic dependency on the mainland’s markets.
Thus, Taiwan’s future depends on whether to secure reciprocity in light of
specific terms and conditions of .
Importance here is a lesson learned from the failed U.S.-Soviet in
the 1970s to which Washington and Moscow agreed without sharing common
understanding of what it entailed. Washington saw as necessary for
global international relations and then the peaceful coexistence of Western
capitalism and Eastern Socialism/Communism. Moscow, however, considered
as applying to only its European front. As a result, Moscow continued
aggressive military intervention in the rest of the world, centered on Angola,
Mozambique, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Central America, since under its con-
ception of “,” Washington was largely unprepared to counter Soviet
military offensives. Consequently, in the 1980s, Washington responded with
an even harder line against the Soviets.
It therefore is critical to determine Beijing’s real motive because it could
take advantage of the current cross-Strait to gain a decisive, and irre-
versible, superiority in all areas.
In the military sphere, Beijing has not at all decelerated its defense spend-
ing, arms buildup, training, and deployment of forces directed at Taiwan, even
during this cross-Strait. For more than two decades, Beijing has main-
tained that it offensive posture is justified in deterring Taiwan’s de jure inde-
pendence or preparing for possible cross-Strait contingencies if it did declare
independence. Yet, the justification is no longer tenable, because both Ma and
the KMT are firmly committed to maintenance of the cross-Strait status quo
that denies the de jure independence. In addition, Taiwan’s arms buildup and
	

 27
modernization have stalled, owing to the slowdown of arms imports from the
United States, essential to maintaining its military balance over Taiwan Strait.
Beijing’s continuing arms buildup, therefore, indicates either its disregard of
or the inability of its civilian leadership to control its resource-hungry
military, thereby upsetting the cross-Strait balance of military power as the in-
dispensable foundation of .
In the political sphere, despite the seminal importance of the 1992 consen-
sus, the Ma administration and the ruling KMT do not explicitly subscribe to
“one China, respective interpretations,” thereby failing to reject the Beijing’s
claim that “one China” means Taiwan is part of the PRC. On May 28, 2008,
KMT President Wu Poh-hsiung met Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chair-
man and PRC President, Hu Jin-tao, in Beijing. Although both referred to “one
China,” Wu failed to obtain Hu’s confirmation on the meaning of “one China,
respective interpretations
(４)
.” Also during the meeting, Wu addressed Hu Jin-tao
as President Hu but referred to Ma Ying-jeou as Mr. Ma
(５)
. Finally, Wu was un-
successful to secure Hu’s commitment to Taiwan’s participation in the World
Health Organization (WHO). Hu was willing only to discuss the WHO issue
(６)
.
The Ma administration and the ruling KMT could not but submit themselves
to their unequal relationship with Beijing. This submissive stance was clear in
Ma’s interview on August 26, 2008, citing the cross-Strait relationship only as
between two administrative regions and not as an inter-state relationship.
This admission contrasts with the “special state-to-state relations” and the
“one country on each side” of the former ROC Presidents Lee Teng-hui and
Chen Shui-bian, respectively
(７)
. Moreover, Beijing so far has shown no signifi-
cant sign of committing to Taipei’s interpretation of . Faced with the
imminent danger of a swine flu pandemic, Beijing decided to tolerate Taipei’s
observer status in WHO’s 2009 general assembly but not its formal WHO
membership in WHO. Because the observer status requires annual renewal,
it does not mean a permanent right to attend the meeting
(８)
.
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In the economic and social spheres, the Ma administration was quick to im-
plement a series of economic engagement measures, such as starting direct
charter flights to the mainland on weekends, the arrival of mainland tourists,
deregulating Taiwanese investment in the mainland, and promoting
mainlanders’ investment in Taiwan. These measures will surely bring about
Taiwan’s integration with the mainland, which is already Taiwan’s largest mar-
ket. Certainly, closer integration will develop dense supply-chain networks
through investment and production in the mainland, and consequently increase
Taiwan’s dependency and vulnerability vis--vis the mainland. As of 2008, the
last year of the Chen administration, the mainland was already the Taiwan’s
largest trading partner ($ 132.5 billion) and the largest investment recipient
($ 150200 billion), while some five million Taiwanese visited the mainland in
the year
(９)
. As of April 2009, one million Taiwanese, 4.4％ of the total popula-
tion, reside in the mainland
(10)
. In addition, closer relations will strengthen the
pro-Beijing forces in Taiwan, particularly among the KMT political and eco-
nomic elites. They will be inclined to choose unification on Beijing’s terms in
a social-political progression similar to the run-up process of Hong Kong’s re-
version to the mainland
(11)
. Such integration could benefit both Taiwan and the
mainland through a win-win game of development and prosperity, but over
time, the mainland will inevitably become dominant economically amid in-
creasing Taiwan’s dependence on and vulnerability to the mailnad. The cost of
breaking this interdependent relationship, therefore, would be much higher for
Taipei than for Beijing. And when their relationship progresses to the point
that Taiwan cannot live and prosper without the mainland, Taipei will have to
capitulate to Beijing’s terms of unification.
Since the inception of Ma’s “flexible diplomacy,” cross-Strait interaction has
rapidly grown economically and socially, but with few military and /or political
achievements. The state of affairs hints at, or perhaps attests to, Beijing’s only
lightly veiled intent to take advantage of the to create the necessary
	
	 29
military and economic conditions for cross-Strait unification on its own terms.
3．Japan’s Taiwan Policy
Over time, this current cross-Strait will have a highly corrosive ef-
fect on Taiwan’s de facto independence and the regional status quo, even
though it has significantly reduced the uncertainty inherent in the spiral of
provocation, miscalculation, armed conflict, and escalation. That is, the current
stability does not necessarily promise long-term peace. Although in response
to this , Japan has taken a wait-and-see approach, it must begin to
recalibrate its cross-Strait policy in order to defend its national interests.
Taiwan is of vital strategic importance to Japan’s national security. Because
of the island’s location on Japan’s major south-bound sea-lanes of communica-
tions, allowing the PRC to take control of them is simply not acceptable for Ja-
pan. This means that Japan needs to secure the freedom of navigation on both
sides of Taiwan, not necessarily the de jure independence of a Republic of Tai-
wan. But Taiwan also is Japan’s fourth largest trading partners, after the PRC,
the United States, and South Korea. Therefore, Taiwan’s continued prosperity
as a democracy and a free-market economy is indispensable to Japanese eco-
nomic and commercial interests. Thus, ceteris paribus, an independent Taiwan
is Japan’s best interests.
For practical reasons, the Japanese government has consistently taken a
noncommittal position on Taiwan’s status under international law. From 1895
to 1945, Taiwan was part of the Japanese Empire, but Japan gave up its sover-
eign rights to the island in accordance with the 1952 San Francisco Peace
Treaty. Since then, the official Japanese government position has been to say
nothing about who possesses Taiwan. Moreover, it cannot support one
country’s claim to the island while denying another’s. Supporting any
country’s claim is surely in contravention of the obligations under the Peace
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Treaty. Because the Treaty does not stipulate which country should have the
sovereign rights to Taiwan, its status remains unsettled and can be deter-
mined unequivocally only by a second peace conference. The 1972 joint 
	between Japan and the PRC stipulates that Japan fully “understands”
and “respects” the PRC’s sovereign claim to Taiwan ; in turn, Japan has never
“recognized” that Taiwan is part of the PRC’s territory.
Japan’s strategic interests regarding Taiwan and its official international le-
gal position on the island diverge. To sidestep the issue, Japan has taken two
approaches to cross-Strait relations. The first is for Japan to stay out of the
conflict as much as possible and, at most, to provide logistical and intelligence
support for any U.S. military operation : buck-passing. The second is for Japan
to openly support the United States against the PRC: balancing power.
The first “buck-passing” approach is better because Tokyo then can avoid
the issue and can benefit from the cross-Strait status quo which ensures the
freedom of navigation in the area around Taiwan and free trade with it. None-
theless, this approach makes sense only if the United States is willing as well
as capable to use its military power to maintain the status quo. Over the last
decade in which U.S. hegemony has gradually experienced relative decline,
however, this assumption has become less sure, and now increasingly less
sure because the ongoing financial and economic crisis and the quagmires in
Iraq and Afghanistan have severely weakened the hegemony. As a result,
Washington is expected to become less and less inclined to intervene in sup-
port of Taiwan.
The second “balancing power” approach carries a significant risk for Japan
because it could lead to military confrontation with the PRC. Even so, Japan’s
defense policy has slowly but steadily shifted in this direction. Currently, Japa-
nese policy contains elements of both approaches, but the second approach is
taking precedence. In the first approach, Japan would give the United States
logistical and intelligence support only from Japanese territory. In contrast,
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the second approach would include such support also from the high seas and
the air space over them, as long as Japanese forces were not deployed to a
combat zone or Japan’s support did not become integral part of a U.S. military
operation. In 1996, the United States and Japan drew up the bilateral Guide-
lines for Defense Cooperation, and in 1999, Japan enacted the law ensuring
Japan’s peace and security in situations in areas surrounding Japan, which
authorizes Tokyo to take military action in accordance with the second ap-
proach.
The North Korea crisis in 1990s was the impetus for the Guidelines, but
both Japanese policy makers and the informed public recognize that the PRC
is now a principal target of the Guidelines, although Tokyo has never admitted
so explicitly. In addition, “the areas surrounding Japan” is a situational, not a
geographical, concept. Yet, the Guidelines will be easily applied to a cross-
Strait contingency. In February 2005, Japan advanced toward the second ap-
proach by concluding a joint with the United States that openly
regards Taiwan as a common security concern. For its part, Tokyo agreed to
give logistical and intelligence supports to U.S. forces in case of a Taiwan con-
tingency, but it ruled out any combat missions. In fact, Director-General of
Japan’s Ministry of Defense Bureau of Defense Policy, Takamizawa
Nobushige, announced at a meeting of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party on
March 13, 2008, that a Taiwan contingency would be treated as an area-
surrounding-Japan situation
(12)
.
As long as the cross-Strait status quo holds, Japan’s Taiwan policy will be
reasonably stable, needing only minor adjustments between the first and sec-
ond approaches. But if the 	

should collapse, Japan will have to rethink
its policy. Next, the following will discuss about some ideas and policy
measures in regard to preparing for or preventing the worst case scenario.
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4．Risk Management Options for Japan’s Taiwan Policy
Preserving the cross-Strait status quo until Taiwan and a fully democratized
PRC are peacefully united is paramount, owing to the Strait’s geo-strategic im-
portance to Japan’s national security. The alliance between Japan and the
United States is premised on Japan’s giving up its strategic independence and
relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. But if the alliance fails to ensure peace
and security in the Strait, Tokyo will no longer rely on the alliance and either
restore its strategic independence for survival or submit to rapidly growing
PRC’s military power in the area. Whichever its choice, Japan will become a
wild card, upsetting the San Francisco Peace Treaty system as the Asia-Pacific
part of the Yalta regime. Although it is intriguing to speculate these various
scenarios, they are beyond the scope of this paper.
More practical is preserving the cross-Strait status quo by Tokyo using spe-
cific policy measure to head off or minimize any risks to. These meas-
ures not only must compensate for Taipei’s 	hasty, and imbalanced
concessions in pursuit of the cross-Strait , but also must supplement
and even complement U.S. military power so that Washington remains willing
and capable to intervene if necessary. Tokyo will no longer be able to settle
in an approach premised on full U. S. hegemony (or the “buck-passing” ap-
proach), but instead must increasingly tilt toward reinforcing the United
State’s power in the region (or the “balancing power” approach).
First, Tokyo must accelerate its formal and informal policy discussions with
Taipei and Washington, with the aim of preserving the cross-Strait status quo.
Discussions by Japanese, Taiwanese, and American policy researchers and
academics are particularly important, since neither Tokyo nor Washington has
formal diplomatic channel with Taipei. Such discussion should center on
persuading Beijing to agree to slow its rapid buildup of arms and to cease try-
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ing to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. Tokyo must reach a common understand-
ing with Washington, and then both must press Taipei to stop making unilat-
eral concession without concrete reciprocation by Beijing. In addition, to
preclude any uncertainty about cross-Strait relations, Taipei must remain com-
mitted to the 1992 consensus.
Second, Tokyo must strengthen its involvement with the Taiwanese econ-
omy so as to limit Taiwan’s economic dependence on and vulnerability to the
mainland. Japan’s support will help halt Taiwan’s downward spiral of unilateral
concessions and deepening dependence. Tokyo also must expand its trade
with Taiwan and encourage Washington to conclude its proposed Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) with Taipei. If Japan’s economic engagement is successful,
it will exert a significant countervailing effect on the mainland’s sway over Tai-
wan. For example, Tokyo’s and Taipei’s recent decision to have their major
microchip firms form a strategic alliance during the ongoing global economic
crisis may further integrate Taiwan into Japan’s regional supply-chain net-
works of investment, production and trade. Such networks could coexist with
a U.S.-Taiwan FTA in context of the evolving webs of regional economic
integration
(13)
.
Third, in cooperation with Washington, Tokyo has to persuade Taipei,
through informal policy discussion, to follow through on its pending arms im-
ports agreements from the United State, in order to counterbalance Beijing’s
extensive arms buildup, which already has had a serious destabilizing effect on
the cross-Strait status quo. In addition, along with Washington, Tokyo must
welcome Taipei’s efforts to modernize and professionalize its military, includ-
ing the proposed abolition of conscription, and encourage Taipei to expend the
contrived funds for armed imports. Both Tokyo and Washington need to
prompt Taipei to enhance qualitatively, if not quantitatively, its defense capa-
bility.
Fourth, Tokyo must strengthen its military power in the areas surrounding
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Japan in general and its south-bound sea-lanes of communication in particular.
Japan also must accelerate the modernization of its maritime and air capabili-
ties. Its priorities should move from the earlier Cold War emphasis on the
northern front, in Hokkaido, to the western and southern fronts, in Kyushu
and Okinawa. Funds for mechanized ground forces will need to be reallocated
accordingly.
Tokyo is now moving in this direction. For instance, its Air Self-Defense
Force (SDF) is planning to acquire next generation tactical air superiority
fighters to replace the current F15 aircraft. The Maritime SDF (MSDF) has
recently commissioned the first de facto helicopter carrier
(14)
, after having built
three large flush-deck landing ships equipped with limited amphibious assault
capability
(15)
. A second helicopter carrier is scheduled to commission in 2011, and
a third being considered is a VSTOL carrier
(16)
. All these will augment the SDF’s
military power, which has been improved gradually but substantially through
cumulative investment over the decades in major platforms, weapon system,
and defense infrastructures as related to AEGIS vessels, AWACS aircraft, air-
borne refueling aircraft, and a missile defense system.
Fifth, Tokyo might have to take more drastic measures to supplement and
even complement U.S. military power if Beijing accelerates aggressive arms
buildup and if Washington becomes less willing to intervene in case of a Tai-
wan contingency. In this case, Japan’s MSDF could double the size of its sub-
marine fleet by extending the duration of each sub’s service from fifteen to
thirty years, which is the major navies’ standard. Tokyo has long halved the
life cycle simply to maintain its submarine-building capability. The new subs
are equipped with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) capability, reinforcing
the inclusion of the SDF’s sole semi-strategic capability in the calculation, par-
ticularly by Beijing, of the region’s balance of power. Tokyo might even con-
sider the addition of nuclear-powered attack submarines. It also could build a
few medium-sized aircraft carriers for fixed-wing airplanes for carrier battle
	
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groups, particularly if Beijing built a blue-water navy that included carrier bat-
tle groups. Most likely, Tokyo will follow a prudent and reactive approach
aimed to prevent regional arms race. But if Japan were faced with an over-
whelming threat, it would be compelled to act quickly and decisively.
Sixth, Tokyo must conclude a nuclear sharing arrangement
(17)
with the United
States, in the event that Washington should be unwilling to intervene on behalf
of Taiwan. Washington has concluded similar agreements individually with
Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Netherlands, which give Washington control
over its nuclear weapons stored in these countries in peacetime through Per-
missive Action Links (PALs) but hand over control of the weapons to each
party to the agreements in wartime
(18)
. A similar arrangement between Japan and
the United States would give Tokyo a limited yet effective nuclear deterrence
vis--vis Beijing.
The preceding six options are step-by-step policy measures for Tokyo to
consider implementing in response to the threat it faces. The worst case sce-
nario, which currently is improbable but still is possible, is Washington’s losing
its hegemony and subsequently withdrawing from the region’s security, thus
forcing Tokyo to revert to being strategically independent. These six options,
however, mesh with the worst-case scenario, because the sequential imple-
mentation of the options will be essential to meet it.
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